Skepticism in K ant's Groundwork

This paper offers a new interpretation of K ant's relationship with skepticism in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals . My position differs from commonly held views in the literature in two ways. On the one hand, I argue that K ant's relationship with skepticism is active and systematic (contrary to H ill, W ood, R awls, T immermann, and A llison). On the other hand, I argue that the kind of skepticism K ant is interested in does not speak to the philosophical tradition in any straightforward sense (contrary to F orster and G uyer). On my reading, K ant takes up a skeptical method in the Groundwork as a way of exposing certain obstacles in our ordinary and philosophical thinking about morality. The central obstacle he is interested in is practical in character, arising from a natural tendency we have to rationalize against the moral law. In attempting to resolve this tendency, I argue, the Groundwork turns out to have a profoundly educative task.