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Logic and Ontology in H egel's Theory of Predication
Author(s) -
Harrelson Kevin J.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12050
Subject(s) - proposition , sketch , epistemology , predicative expression , inference , ontology , philosophy , subject (documents) , hegelianism , existentialism , reading (process) , domain (mathematical analysis) , order (exchange) , computer science , linguistics , mathematics , algorithm , library science , mathematical analysis , finance , economics
In this paper I sketch some arguments that underlie H egel's chapter on judgment, and I attempt to place them within a broad tradition in the history of logic. Focusing on his analysis of simple predicative assertions or ‘positive judgments’, I first argue that H egel supplies an instructive alternative to the classical technique of existential quantification. The main advantage of his theory lies in his treatment of the ontological implications of judgments, implications that are inadequately captured by quantification. The second concern of this paper is the manner in which Hegel makes logic not only dependent on ontology generally, but also variant in regard to domains of objects. In other words, he offers a domain‐specific logical theory, according to which the form of judgment or inference is specific to the subject of judgment. My third concern lies with the metaphilosophical consequences of this theory, and this includes some more familiar H egelian themes. It is well known that H egel frequently questioned the adequacy of the sentential form for expressing higher order truths. My reading of his theory of predication explains and contextualizes this tendency by demystifying notions like the so‐called speculative proposition.