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F orced S upererogation
Author(s) -
Cohen Shlomo
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12023
Subject(s) - deontic logic , action (physics) , obligation , blame , set (abstract data type) , epistemology , moral obligation , philosophy , social psychology , psychology , political science , computer science , law , physics , quantum mechanics , programming language
There is a disturbing kind of situation that presents agents with only two possibilities of moral action—one especially praiseworthy, the other condemnable. I describe such scenarios and argue that moral action in them exhibits a unique set of parameters: performing the commendable action is especially praiseworthy; not performing is not blameworthy; not performing is wrong. This set of parameters is distinct from those which characterize either moral obligation or supererogation. It is accordingly claimed that it defines a distinct, yet unrecognized, deontic category, to which the name ‘ F orced S upererogation’ is appropriate. The moral parameters of F orced S upererogation and the relations between them are discussed, especially the divergence of wrongness and blame. I argue that this new category allows a more accurate classification of moral actions than that imposed by the strained dichotomy of obligation versus supererogation.

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