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In Defence of a Structural Account of Indirect Realism
Author(s) -
Sollberger Michael
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/ejop.12015
Subject(s) - direct and indirect realism , epistemology , orthodoxy , realism , pariah group , philosophical realism , consciousness , perception , philosophy , face (sociological concept) , critical realism (philosophy of perception) , antipathy , political science , law , politics , linguistics , theology
Current orthodoxy in the philosophy of perception views indirect realism as misguided, wrongheaded or simply outdated. The reasons for its pariah status are variegated. Although it is surely not unreasonable to speculate that philosophical fashion is one factor that contributes to this situation, there are also solid philosophical arguments which put pressure on the indirect realist position. In this paper, I will discuss one such main objection and show how the indirect realist can face it. The upshot will be a defence of a new structural account of indirect realism which is immune to a number of objections that have been traditionally levelled at such theories of perceptual consciousness.