Premium
Developing global champions: Why national oil companies expand abroad
Author(s) -
Cheon Andrew
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/ecpo.12133
Subject(s) - corporate governance , competition (biology) , revenue , government (linguistics) , business , democracy , industrial organization , economics , international trade , finance , international economics , political science , politics , law , ecology , linguistics , philosophy , biology
Abstract National oil companies ( NOC s) have invested hundreds of billions of dollars in foreign oil and gas assets. Why have some governments increased their NOC outward investments, while others have not? I argue that domestic structures can influence a government's calculus that potential benefits, such as added revenues and fuel supply, outweigh potential costs, such as information asymmetries and inefficiencies associated with NOC s. Nationally, partisan competition limits democratic tolerance for failures by NOC s. Bureaucratically, overlapping authority in energy policy undermines coherent NOC governance. Based on investments by NOC s hailing from 79 countries, 2000–2013, I find robust evidence for the national hypothesis.