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Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule, trade openness, and labor market condition
Author(s) -
Acharya Ram C.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/ecpo.12110
Subject(s) - economics , openness to experience , commercial policy , subsidy , redistribution (election) , free trade , international economics , general equilibrium theory , trade barrier , revenue , politics , microeconomics , market economy , psychology , accounting , social psychology , political science , law
Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market.