Premium
Cooperation against all predictions
Author(s) -
Bolle Friedel,
Spiller Jörg
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12976
Subject(s) - mathematical economics , equilibrium selection , selection (genetic algorithm) , economics , binary number , microeconomics , public good , game theory , repeated game , computer science , mathematics , artificial intelligence , arithmetic
In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non‐cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates). In four rather diverse examples of four‐player Stag Hunt games, three prominent concepts of equilibrium selection favor E0. Experiments, however, result in cooperation frequencies between 70.3% and 99.7%. Also for k < n , the selected equilibria clearly differ from experimental behavior. We interpret our observations by suggesting the concept Behavioral Equilibrium Selection.