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BUDGET COMMITTEE AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER: EVIDENCE FROM SOUTH KOREA
Author(s) -
Kim HyunA,
Lee Dongwon,
Park Sangwon
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12905
Subject(s) - legislature , subsidy , member states , political science , economics , public administration , public economics , international economics , law , european union
This paper revisits the claim that members of legislative committees direct more earmark spending to their constituents. In South Korea's legislature, a national law regulating the budget committee provides an unusual source of exogenous variation in membership: members of the committee are rotated each year owing to 1‐year term limits. Using data from 226 local governments, and both within‐district and within‐member variations in membership, we find that districts represented by a budget committee member secure roughly 3% more subsidies than those represented by a nonmember. ( JEL D72, D78, H70)