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DOES PUBLIC ATTENTION REDUCE THE INFLUENCE OF MONEYED INTERESTS? POLICY POSITIONS ON SOPA/PIPA BEFORE AND AFTER THE INTERNET BLACKOUT
Author(s) -
Matter Ulrich,
Stutzer Alois
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12812
Subject(s) - blackout , salience (neuroscience) , exploit , the internet , order (exchange) , unilateralism , economics , property rights , public policy , political science , public economics , politics , computer security , law , microeconomics , finance , computer science , economic growth , power (physics) , physics , electric power system , quantum mechanics , artificial intelligence , world wide web
We investigate the role of public attention in determining the effect that campaign contributions by interest groups have on legislators' policy positions. We exploit the shock in public attention induced by the Internet service blackout of January 2012 that increased the salience of the Stop Online Piracy Act/Protect IP Act (SOPA/PIPA) bills aimed at stronger protection of property rights on the Internet. Using a new dataset of U.S. congressmen's public statements, we find a strong statistical relationship between campaign contributions funded by the affected industries and legislators' positions. However, this relationship evaporates once the two bills become primary policy issues. Our results are consistent with the notion that legislators choose positions on secondary policy issues in order to cater to organized interests, whereas positions on primary policy issues are driven by electoral support. ( JEL D72, L82, L86)