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COOPERATION IN PUBLIC GOODS GAMES PREDICTS BEHAVIOR IN INCENTIVE‐MATCHED BINARY DILEMMAS: EVIDENCE FOR STABLE PROSOCIALITY
Author(s) -
Mullett Timothy L.,
McDonald Rebecca L.,
Brown Gordon D.A.
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12796
Subject(s) - public good , incentive , public goods game , preference , microeconomics , task (project management) , economics , social preferences , social psychology , social dilemma , predictability , psychology , risk aversion (psychology) , trait , prosocial behavior , experimental economics , expected utility hypothesis , mathematical economics , computer science , statistics , mathematics , management , programming language
We report the results of an experiment in which subjects completed second mover public goods game tasks and second mover binary social dilemma tasks. Each task was completed under three different incentive structures which were matched across tasks. The use of nonlinear incentive structures, along with a novel categorization method, allowed us to identify behavioral subtypes that cannot be distinguished using conventional linear incentive structures. We also examined how well behavior could be predicted across tasks. Subjects' average conditional cooperation levels showed significant cross‐task predictability and stability. However, almost a third of responses (28%) demonstrated unambiguous preference reversals across tasks. We argue that prosociality is best described as an individual‐level trait, similar to risk aversion in choice under risk. ( JEL C7, C91, H41)