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ADDRESSING SOCIAL DILEMMAS WITH MASCOTS, INFORMATION, AND GRAPHICS
Author(s) -
Butler Julianna M.,
Fooks Jacob R.,
Messer Kent D.,
PalmForster Leah H.
Publication year - 2020
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12783
Subject(s) - social dilemma , public good , externality , incentive , dilemma , nonpoint source pollution , quality (philosophy) , environmental economics , microeconomics , public economics , economics , water quality , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , biology
Reducing nonpoint source pollution is a complex social dilemma involving externalities, information asymmetries, and coordination problems. Using a laboratory experiment, this research investigates how mascots, public information, and data visualization can improve collective group behavior to address a social dilemma. Results show that groups reduce pollution in the experiment when a community mascot expresses negative emotions in response to poor water quality outcomes. Additionally, groups pollute less when they are provided public information about water quality, and abatement is greater when feedback is negatively framed. This study demonstrates how novel nonmonetary incentives can be used to achieve a collective environmental goal. ( JEL D79, Q25, Q52, Q53, D83)