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QUANTIFYING THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF ANTICARTEL ENFORCEMENT
Author(s) -
Davies Stephen,
Mariuzzo Franco,
Ormosi Peter L.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12574
Subject(s) - harm , enforcement , economics , sort , public economics , law enforcement , law and economics , econometrics , law , political science , computer science , information retrieval
This paper presents a rare attempt to quantify the deterrent effect of anticartel policy. It develops a conceptual framework, which establishes the sort of information necessary for such quantification. This is then illustrated and calibrated by drawing upon existing literatures and using evidence from legal cartels to approximate what would be observed absent policy. Measuring impact by the proportion of all potential harm that is deterred, our best estimate is two‐thirds and, even on conservative assumptions, at least half of all harms (or seven times the detected harm) is deterred. ( JEL H11, K21, L44)