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THE AGENCY OF POLITICS AND SCIENCE
Author(s) -
Gerber Anke,
HaitaFalah Corina,
Lange Andreas
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12562
Subject(s) - stylized fact , reputation , agency (philosophy) , principal (computer security) , politics , principal–agent problem , ideal (ethics) , information asymmetry , economics , law and economics , microeconomics , positive economics , political science , sociology , law , finance , corporate governance , macroeconomics , computer science , social science , operating system
We study a principal‐agent relationship between a politician and a researcher that captures stylized facts regarding the involvement of politics into scientific research. The politician has some ideal policy that he would like to implement, but needs to contract with a researcher to choose a policy that is supported by scientific advice. We study the implemented contracts under symmetric and under asymmetric information about the researcher's ability and concern for reputation, and discuss with which types of researchers the politician will contract. We identify several conflicts between the interests of voters and those of the politician. ( JEL D72, D82, D83)