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LAW ENFORCEMENT AND WRONGFUL ARRESTS WITH ENDOGENOUSLY (IN)COMPETENT OFFICERS
Author(s) -
Mishra Ajit,
Samuel Andrew
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12534
Subject(s) - officer , competence (human resources) , sanctions , law enforcement , enforcement , economics , business , law and economics , law , political science , management
Economic intuition suggests that enforcement errors incentivize crimes, therefore officers must be penalized for committing such errors. Legal scholars argue that if penalties for errors are severe, officers may become timid while policing (thereby encouraging crime). We evaluate these arguments in a model where officers invest in competence. Competence increases the officer's ability to identify criminals. Low sanctions for errors encourages bold policing by officers but may still raise the equilibrium level of crime because it also discourages investments in competence. Granting immunity to only competent officers (“qualified immunity”) reduces both errors and crimes when competence is observable. ( JEL K4, K42, L5)