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PATENT BREADTH IN AN INTERNATIONAL SETTING
Author(s) -
Bond Eric W.,
Zissimos Ben
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12440
Subject(s) - harmonization , economics , nash equilibrium , welfare , comparative advantage , international economics , microeconomics , international trade , market economy , physics , acoustics
We examine the Nash equilibria of a game where two national governments set patent breadth strategically. Broader patents make R&D more attractive, but the effect on static efficiency is nonmonotonic. In a North–South model, where only the North can innovate, harmonization of patent breadth lowers welfare relative to the Nash equilibrium. When both countries can innovate, harmonization toward narrower patent breadth may raise world welfare. ( JEL F02, F13, O3, O31, O32)