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ENDOWMENTS, PERCEIVED SIMILARITY, AND DICTATOR GIVING
Author(s) -
Goerg Sebastian J.,
Johnson David B.,
Rogers Jonathan D.
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12408
Subject(s) - fungibility , dictator , endowment , dictator game , economics , similarity (geometry) , microeconomics , perception , affect (linguistics) , endowment effect , politics , biology , psychology , computer science , finance , philosophy , communication , epistemology , artificial intelligence , neuroscience , political science , law , image (mathematics)
A common assumption of money is that it is fungible. An implication of this assumption is that the source of money does not affect economic decision making. We find evidence contradicting this fungibility assumption. Specifically, we explore how the perception of an endowment source influences amounts sent in a dictator game. We find perceived similarity to the endowment provider to be negatively correlated with dictator offers. Dictators who consider themselves relatively more similar to their endowment provider send significantly smaller amounts to their partners. Our results demonstrate that economic decision making can be influenced by the provider of income shocks. ( JEL C78, C91, C99, D31, D64, D74)