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MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIA AND DETERRENCE IN AIRLINE MARKETS
Author(s) -
Ciliberto Federico,
Zhang Zhou
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12381
Subject(s) - deterrence theory , deterrence (psychology) , economics , microeconomics , strategic complements , bayesian game , game theory , sequential game , law and economics , physics , nuclear physics
We use a longitudinal dataset from the U.S. airline industry to estimate three different models for entry games with very general forms of heterogeneity between U.S. carriers in airline markets: a simultaneous game with complete information and two sequential games with or without strategic entry deterrence. In a sequential game with entry deterrence, an incumbent decides whether to incur a cost to deter potential entrants. We show that the model with sequential games with strategic deterrence provides the best fit to the data. We conclude that the results reject the hypothesis of a static model and support the hypothesis of the existence of strategic entry deterrence. ( JEL L1)

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