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FUNDRAISING INTERMEDIARIES INHIBIT QUALITY‐DRIVEN CHARITABLE DONATIONS
Author(s) -
Coffman Lucas C.
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12379
Subject(s) - donation , intermediary , quality (philosophy) , business , affect (linguistics) , marketing , economics , public relations , advertising , political science , sociology , economic growth , philosophy , communication , epistemology
Charitable donations are frequently raised by an intermediary, which accepts donations and subsequently sends the proceeds to the chairty—for example, a workplace campaign for United Way, a 5‐km walk for Susan G. Komen, or buying cookies from a local troop for the Girl Scouts. These fundraisers can greatly increase donations received by a given charity, but how do they affect what types of charities we support? This article shows intermediary fundraisers can make donors insensitive to differences in charity quality: Unattractive charities can receive the same financial support as an attractive charity. In a series of across‐subject experiments, when donations are framed as going directly to the charity, unattractive charities receive fewer and smaller contributions relative to attractive charities; however, when donations for the same charities are collected by (meaningless) intermediary fundraising campaigns, donations become indistinguishable across charities. The fundraising campaign does not affect donor recall of charity identity or evaluation of charity quality; it simply precludes donors from using these data in the donation decision. Follow‐up experiments suggest the results are driven by information overload. ( JEL A13, C91, C93, D61, D64, H41)