Premium
SIGNALING IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE EFFECT OF ACCESS TO ELITE COLLEGES ON CHOICE OF MAJOR
Author(s) -
Bostwick Valerie
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12340
Subject(s) - elite , productivity , higher education , affect (linguistics) , point (geometry) , mathematics education , field (mathematics) , psychology , demographic economics , economics , political science , economic growth , mathematics , geometry , communication , politics , law , pure mathematics
I propose a model of postsecondary education in which major field of study can be used by individuals to signal productivity to employers. Under this signaling model, I show that geographic areas with high access to elite universities result in fewer science, technology, engineering, and mathematics ( STEM ) majors among lower ability students at nonelite colleges. This is distinct from the prediction of a full information model in which access to elite schools should only affect high ability individuals directly. Using data from the National Center for Education Statistics' Baccalaureate & Beyond survey, I find evidence that is consistent with the signaling model prediction, specifically a 2.3–3.7 percentage point or 16%–25% decrease in the probability of choosing a STEM major among lower ability students in areas with greater access to elite colleges. ( JEL I21, J24)