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MEASURING EFFORT INCENTIVES IN A TOURNAMENT WITH MANY PARTICIPANTS: THEORY AND APPLICATION
Author(s) -
Han Chirok,
Kang Changhui,
Lee SamHo
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12300
Subject(s) - tournament , incentive , empirical research , economics , grading (engineering) , competition (biology) , measure (data warehouse) , microeconomics , econometrics , empirical evidence , public economics , computer science , mathematics , statistics , engineering , data mining , ecology , combinatorics , biology , philosophy , civil engineering , epistemology
This article provides an empirical measure to compare incentive effects of different tournament structures. Although there have been many theoretical attempts to analyze incentive effects of a tournament competition, empirical applications are limited as the provided conditions cannot easily be empirically observed. We show that the empirical density of the performance distribution can be used to measure effort incentives in a tournament with many participants. We apply this method to evaluate the grading policy change in the 2008 College Scholastic Ability Test in South Korea. ( JEL C70, C51)