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ALLIANCES IN THE SHADOW OF CONFLICT
Author(s) -
Ke Changxia,
Konrad Kai A.,
Morath Florian
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12151
Subject(s) - alliance , shadow (psychology) , adversary , economics , settlement (finance) , internal conflict , anticipation (artificial intelligence) , political economy , international trade , political science , law , politics , computer security , psychology , computer science , finance , artificial intelligence , payment , psychotherapist
Victorious alliances often fight about the spoils of war. This article presents an experiment on the determinants of whether alliances break up and fight internally after having defeated a joint enemy. First, if peaceful sharing yields an asymmetric rent distribution, this increases the likelihood of fighting. In turn, anticipation of the higher likelihood of internal fight reduces the alliance's ability to succeed against the outside enemy. Second, the option to make nonbinding nonaggression declarations between alliance members does not make peaceful settlement within the alliance more likely. Third, higher differences in the alliance players' contributions to alliance effort lead to more internal conflict and more intense fighting . ( JEL D72, D74)