Premium
PARTIES, POLITICS, AND REGULATION: EVIDENCE FROM CLEAN AIR ACT ENFORCEMENT
Author(s) -
Innes Robert,
Mitra Arnab
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12142
Subject(s) - regression discontinuity design , clean air act , enforcement , congressman , politics , local election , panel data , law enforcement , house of representatives , public administration , economics , political science , public economics , law , air pollution , econometrics , medicine , chemistry , organic chemistry , pathology
Does local Federal regulation respond to the preferences of local Congressional representatives? For example, do Republican Congressmen reduce local enforcement of Clean Air laws in their districts? We use facility‐level panel data on Clean Air Act inspections over 1989–2005 to study the causal effect of a Congressman's party affiliation on local enforcement. Random assignment of electoral outcomes is obtained with a Regression Discontinuity design. We find that new Republican (vs. Democratic) Representatives significantly depress inspection rates for local polluting facilities in the first year after their election . ( JEL D73, Q52, Q53)