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CAPS IN SEQUENTIAL CONTESTS
Author(s) -
MEGIDISH REUT,
SELA ANER
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12031
Subject(s) - economics , mathematical economics , microeconomics , neoclassical economics
We study a sequential two‐stage all‐pay auction with two identical prizes. In each stage, the players compete for one prize and each player can win either one or two prizes. The designer may impose a cap on the players' bids in each of the stages. We analyze the equilibrium in this sequential all‐pay auction with bid caps and show that capping the players' bids is profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize the players' expected total bid . ( JEL D44, D82, J31, J41)