z-logo
Premium
LEADERSHIP BY EXAMPLE IN THE WEAK‐LINK GAME
Author(s) -
CARTWRIGHT EDWARD,
GILLET JORIS,
VAN VUGT MARK
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/ecin.12003
Subject(s) - microeconomics , economics , nash equilibrium , link (geometry) , mathematical economics , computer science , computer network
We investigate the effects of leadership in a four‐player weak‐link game. A weak‐link game is a coordination game with multiple Pareto‐ranked Nash equilibria. Because the more efficient equilibria involve a degree of strategic uncertainty groups typically find it difficult to coordinate on more efficient equilibria. We wanted to see whether leadership by example, in the form of one player acting publicly before the rest of the group, could help groups do better. Our results suggest that leadership can increase efficiency but is far from being a guarantee of success. Specifically, in a significant number of groups we observed successful leadership and increased efficiency, but in most groups efficiency was low despite the efforts of leaders. We did not find any difference between voluntary leaders and leaders that are randomly assigned. (JEL C72, H41 )

This content is not available in your region!

Continue researching here.

Having issues? You can contact us here