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Old and Young Politicians
Author(s) -
Alesina Alberto,
Cassidy Traviss,
Troiano Ugo
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/ecca.12287
Subject(s) - incentive , politics , limit (mathematics) , political science , political economy , demographic economics , economics , public economics , labour economics , market economy , law , mathematical analysis , mathematics
We consider the role of a politician's age in Italian municipal governments. When the term limit is not binding, younger mayors engage in political budget cycles more often than older mayors. Thus younger politicians behave more strategically in response to electoral incentives, probably because they expect to have a longer political career and stronger career concerns. We discuss and rule out several alternative interpretations.