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Mandated Political Representation and Redistribution
Author(s) -
Mitra Anirban
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/ecca.12249
Subject(s) - redistribution (election) , contest , disadvantaged , politics , affirmative action , inequality , economics , representation (politics) , collective action , political science , political economy , economic growth , law , mathematics , mathematical analysis
Mandated political representation for minorities involves earmarking certain electoral districts where only minority‐group candidates are permitted to contest. This paper builds a political‐economy model to analyse the effect of such affirmative action on redistribution in equilibrium. The model predicts that in situations where the minority is economically disadvantaged and where voters exhibit an in‐group bias, such a quota can reduce transfers to poorer groups. This suggests that the gains to the minority group from having such quotas are unevenly distributed. Redistribution in reserved districts leads to a rise in within‐group inequality for the minorities.