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Role‐dependent Social Preferences
Author(s) -
Bolle Friedel,
Otto Philipp E.
Publication year - 2016
Publication title -
economica
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.532
H-Index - 65
eISSN - 1468-0335
pISSN - 0013-0427
DOI - 10.1111/ecca.12180
Subject(s) - microeconomics , economics , constant (computer programming) , simple (philosophy) , revenue , social preferences , bargaining problem , computer science , philosophy , accounting , epistemology , programming language
Bargaining results emerge from the interplay of strategic options and social preferences. For every bargaining game, however, the advantage of a player having certain preferences in terms of negotiated equilibrium revenues might differ. We explore the hypothesis that preferences change according to the players' strength combination. Simple 1×1 bargaining experiments from the literature are discussed, and 2×2 as well as 2×3 assignment market experiments with possible renegotiations are investigated. The assumption that players adopt preferences for two to five roles, defined by strength combinations of the two bargainers, explains the experimental results better than individually constant preferences.