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The Effectiveness of D elhi's Fire Safety Regulation Amidst Poverty, Ignorance, Corruption and Non‐Compliance
Author(s) -
Cobin John M.
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
economic affairs
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.24
H-Index - 18
eISSN - 1468-0270
pISSN - 0265-0665
DOI - 10.1111/ecaf.12042
Subject(s) - dysfunctional family , language change , poverty , incentive , compliance (psychology) , imperfect , ignorance , work (physics) , population , politics , public economics , economics , business , political science , development economics , economic growth , engineering , market economy , law , sociology , psychology , art , social psychology , linguistics , philosophy , mechanical engineering , demography , literature , psychotherapist
Abstract This paper considers the effectiveness of fire safety regulation in D elhi, I ndia. Ten theories are summarised that are used to explain why regulation does or does not work, or why fires might increase. Can imperfect markets generate institutions outside of the political process that produce reasonable results despite challenges of poverty, rising population density, social chaos, widespread corruption and non‐compliance with rules? In D elhi, city fire departments, albeit hampered by dysfunctional or non‐existent regulation, along with social and individual incentives provided by markets, have produced a relatively high level of safety.