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Donor Requirements and Pockets of Effectiveness in Senegal's Bureaucracy
Author(s) -
Johnson Martha C.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
development policy review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.671
H-Index - 61
eISSN - 1467-7679
pISSN - 0950-6764
DOI - 10.1111/dpr.12134
Subject(s) - incentive , bureaucracy , politics , work (physics) , agriculture , value (mathematics) , public economics , economics , political science , business , economic growth , public administration , development economics , geography , market economy , engineering , law , mechanical engineering , archaeology , machine learning , computer science
Donors increasingly value the work of statistics, project assessment and related offices in developing countries, but can they ensure these offices are able to do their work? This article assesses donors’ efforts to do so in Senegal's ministries of finance, health and agriculture in the mid‐2000s. It contends that donors' impact is greatest if they generate political incentives for governments to create ‘pockets of effectiveness’ in these areas. The health and agriculture case studies indicate that direct donor involvement, particularly if incompatible with domestic political forces, produces disappointing results, while the finance case studies suggest donors can induce political support for the work of specific offices if donor incentives coincide with domestic political imperatives.