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Grants for Whom and Why? The Politics of Allocation of Transfers in Brazil
Author(s) -
Ferreira Jorge L D.,
Alves Alexandre F.,
Caldeira Emilie
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
the developing economies
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.305
H-Index - 30
eISSN - 1746-1049
pISSN - 0012-1533
DOI - 10.1111/deve.12265
Subject(s) - opposition (politics) , alliance , politics , public administration , voting , political science , government (linguistics) , state (computer science) , public economics , economics , law , philosophy , linguistics , algorithm , computer science
This study discusses political and electoral reasons for the allocation of intergovernmental transfers in a federal state. We tested the influence of political alignment with the federal government and deputies, and the effects of elections and changes in alliance status upon Brazilian discretionary transfers. We performed a panel data analysis encompassing 2,856 municipalities from 1999 to 2011. The results suggest that the federal government buys support in Congress by awarding grants to deputies. Moreover, the alignment between the municipal and federal chief executives is central to the allocation of grants, and a negative correlation exists when the mayor is affiliated with an opposition party and when an opposition deputy has a strong support base within the municipality. Furthermore, changes in alliance status between the budget‐voting and budget‐implementation stages influence the number of transfers. The federal government also increased the allocation of grants in years featuring municipal and federal elections, particularly the latter.