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Sourcing Decisions with Competitive Suppliers and Imperfect Information
Author(s) -
Jin Yue,
Ryan Jennifer K.,
Yund Walter
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
decision sciences
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.238
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1540-5915
pISSN - 0011-7315
DOI - 10.1111/deci.12069
Subject(s) - outsourcing , business , industrial organization , competition (biology) , production (economics) , process (computing) , warranty , strategic sourcing , vertical integration , competitive advantage , variety (cybernetics) , operations management , marketing , computer science , microeconomics , economics , strategic planning , ecology , strategic financial management , artificial intelligence , political science , law , biology , operating system
Manufacturers often must choose between outsourcing and producing internally. This choice is complex and influenced by a variety of factors, including the costs and capabilities of the potential suppliers. In addition, if the manufacturer outsources, he must design the sourcing process. We study the manufacturer's outsourcing decision, with a focus on the impact of the sourcing process on that decision. We consider a setting in which the manufacturer has imperfect information regarding the suppliers' costs and capabilities, and we assume that the manufacturer uses a two‐stage sourcing process. The first stage is the qualification stage, in which the manufacturer seeks to reduce the uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The second stage is the supplier selection stage, in which the manufacturer selects among the qualified suppliers on the basis of price. We first characterize the optimal design of the two‐stage process, and then consider the outsourcing decision. We demonstrate several trade‐offs. Vertical integration enables the manufacturer to reduce uncertainty and extract all of the profits of production. However, outsourcing enables the manufacturer to take advantage of the (potentially) lower costs and higher capabilities of the suppliers, particularly if competition between suppliers can be encouraged. We find that the manufacturer is more likely to vertically integrate when the warranty cost and the cost of exerting effort during qualification are large, and when there is significant uncertainty regarding the suppliers' capabilities. The manufacturer is more likely to outsource when the suppliers' costs (capabilities) are low (high), and when the number of suppliers is large.