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Rewarding Poor Performance: Why Do Boards of Directors Increase New Options in Response to CEO Underwater Options?
Author(s) -
Sun Yuanyuan,
Shin Taekjin
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
corporate governance: an international review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.866
H-Index - 85
eISSN - 1467-8683
pISSN - 0964-8410
DOI - 10.1111/corg.12065
Subject(s) - attribution , executive compensation , stock options , business , accounting , stock (firearms) , principal–agent problem , compensation (psychology) , agency (philosophy) , empirical evidence , public relations , marketing , corporate governance , finance , psychology , political science , social psychology , sociology , mechanical engineering , philosophy , epistemology , engineering , social science
Abstract Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue When the stock options granted to CEOs go underwater, boards of directors tend to award additional stock options to their CEOs . Drawing on agency theory and attribution theory, this study explores social psychological mechanisms that explain why boards of directors increase new option grants to CEOs in response to underwater options. Research Findings/Insights Using the compensation data of CEOs at 966 US firms, we found that contextual factors such as market conditions and industry performance affected boards of directors' decisions to grant new stock options. Consistent with our hypotheses, boards of directors granted a greater number of new options to CEOs in response to CEOs ' underwater options during the recession period than the recovery period, and they granted fewer new options when the firm's industry performance was high rather than low. Theoretical/Academic Implications This study incorporates attribution theory in understanding boards of directors' causal attribution of firm performance and its impact on executive compensation. It complements earlier studies on causal attribution by exploring the role of contextual factors. It also contributes to the research by examining the attribution process of boards of directors rather than that of top management, as well as the consequences of the causal attribution in terms of ex‐post adjustment in executive option compensation. Practitioner/Policy Implications This study provides up‐to‐date and improved evidence on boards' decision making about executive stock options. Practitioners and policy makers can benefit from the study's findings that board members rely on contextual information about the market and the competition when they make causal attribution of firm performance changes, which tends to affect their decisions about executive compensation.