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Demons of Ecological Rationality
Author(s) -
Otworowska Maria,
Blokpoel Mark,
Sweers Marieke,
Wareham Todd,
Rooij Iris
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.498
H-Index - 114
eISSN - 1551-6709
pISSN - 0364-0213
DOI - 10.1111/cogs.12530
Subject(s) - heuristics , bounded rationality , rationality , ecological rationality , toolbox , computer science , cognitive science , mathematical economics , epistemology , artificial intelligence , psychology , mathematics , philosophy , programming language , operating system
How can resource-bounded minds like our own make rational or otherwise “good” decisions in an uncertain and complex world (Oaksford & Chater, 1998; Simon, 1957, 1990)? The Adaptive Toolbox theory answers this question by defining human rationality in terms of a degree of adaptation of decision strategies (heuristics) to different environments (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2012). When heuristics are adapted to the environment and lead to “good enough” (or even high-quality) decisions, they are said to be ecologically rational. For almost two decades, this theory has been considered a tractable alternative to classical theories of human rationality based on logic or probability theory (Gigerenzer, 2015; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). These classical theories have been criticized for postulating intractable (e.g., NP-hard) computations (Arkes, Gigerenzer, & Hertwig, 2016; Gigerenzer, 2008; Oaksford & Chater, 1998), which suggests that humans must possess demonic computational powers in order to make rational decisions (so-called demons of rationality; Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). It is widely assumed that the Adaptive Toolbox theory circumvents the intractability problem that plagues classical accounts of human rationality, because heuristics are by definition tractable. Yet the notion of ecological rationality hinges on the existence of tractable adaptation processes. Here, we present an argument that, contrary to common belief, the Adaptive Toolbox theory has not yet tamed the intractability demon. Rather, the demon is hiding in the theory’s cornerstone assumption that ecological rationality is achieved by processes of adaptation, such as evolution, development, or learning.