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Causal Responsibility and Counterfactuals
Author(s) -
Lagnado David A.,
Gerstenberg Tobias,
Zultan Ro'i
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
cognitive science
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.498
H-Index - 114
eISSN - 1551-6709
pISSN - 0364-0213
DOI - 10.1111/cogs.12054
Subject(s) - counterfactual thinking , counterfactual conditional , causation , causality (physics) , attribution , outcome (game theory) , causal model , psychology , function (biology) , moral responsibility , epistemology , computer science , positive economics , social psychology , mathematical economics , economics , mathematics , philosophy , statistics , physics , quantum mechanics , evolutionary biology , biology
How do people attribute responsibility in situations where the contributions of multiple agents combine to produce a joint outcome? The prevalence of over‐determination in such cases makes this a difficult problem for counterfactual theories of causal responsibility. In this article, we explore a general framework for assigning responsibility in multiple agent contexts. We draw on the structural model account of actual causation (e.g., Halpern & Pearl, 2005) and its extension to responsibility judgments (Chockler & Halpern, 2004). We review the main theoretical and empirical issues that arise from this literature and propose a novel model of intuitive judgments of responsibility. This model is a function of both pivotality (whether an agent made a difference to the outcome) and criticality (how important the agent is perceived to be for the outcome, before any actions are taken). The model explains empirical results from previous studies and is supported by a new experiment that manipulates both pivotality and criticality. We also discuss possible extensions of this model to deal with a broader range of causal situations. Overall, our approach emphasizes the close interrelations between causality, counterfactuals, and responsibility attributions.