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REGULATORY DEALING: TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION VERSUS ENFORCEMENT STRINGENCY OF EMISSION TAXES
Author(s) -
CORIA JESSICA,
VILLEGASPALACIO CLARA
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/coep.12013
Subject(s) - enforcement , aggregate (composite) , economics , marginal abatement cost , public economics , industrial organization , business , microeconomics , externality , greenhouse gas , ecology , materials science , political science , law , composite material , biology
We analyze the role of targeted enforcement of emissions taxes when the regulator wants to minimize aggregate emissions via the adoption of new more environmentally friendly technology. The regulator wants to speed up the path of technology adoption generated by a policy of uniform enforcement (that monitors adopters and nonadopters with the same probability) by engaging in a regulatory deal where a reduced monitoring probability is granted in “exchange” for adoption of the new technology. We set up a theoretical model, characterize the circumstances in which such dealing minimizes aggregate emissions, and test our hypothesis using economic laboratory experiments. Our analytical and experimental results suggest that even though such a deal might imply an increased level of violation by adopters, such tolerance is rather an integral part of an overall enforcement strategy that minimizes aggregate emissions when the rate of adoption is endogenous. (JEL L51, Q53, Q55, Q58 )