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Auction Design, Incentives, and Buying Back Maryland and Virginia Crab Licenses
Author(s) -
DePiper Geret S.,
Higgins Nathaniel,
Lipton Douglas W.,
Stocking Andrew
Publication year - 2013
Publication title -
canadian journal of agricultural economics/revue canadienne d'agroeconomie
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.505
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1744-7976
pISSN - 0008-3976
DOI - 10.1111/cjag.12005
Subject(s) - common value auction , incentive , fishing , business , fishery , fish <actinopterygii> , economics , microeconomics , biology
Fisheries managers use buybacks to reduce fleet capacity, conserve fish stocks, and accomplish other goals. In 2009, Maryland and Virginia conducted auctions to buy back commercial fishing licenses. The auctions in both States had similar timing, objectives, and target populations. The divergent designs of the auctions, however, provide a case study with which to investigate effective buyback practices. We compare and contrast the market designs used by Maryland and Virginia, and describe how those differing designs influenced the respective outcomes.