Premium
On the profitability of self‐sabotage
Author(s) -
Brown David P.,
Sappington David E. M.
Publication year - 2021
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/caje.12499
Subject(s) - procurement , profitability index , business , limiting , profit (economics) , industrial organization , production (economics) , microeconomics , economics , marketing , finance , mechanical engineering , engineering
We demonstrate how a supplier can enhance his expected profit by intentionally increasing his expected production costs or limiting his ability to reduce these costs. Such self‐sabotage benefits the supplier when it induces a buyer to implement a more favourable procurement policy, i.e., one that motivates the supplier to deliver cost‐reducing effort systematically rather than selectively. We also demonstrate how the seemingly inefficient persistent implementation of a procurement contract that does not change as the prevailing environment changes can reduce procurement costs by deterring self‐sabotage.