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Can EconJobMarket help Canadian universities?
Author(s) -
Nguyen Kim,
Peters Michael,
Poitevin Michel
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/caje.12308
Subject(s) - sorting , matching (statistics) , simple (philosophy) , face (sociological concept) , computer science , operations research , mathematical economics , economics , algorithm , mathematics , sociology , statistics , social science , philosophy , epistemology
We analyze the academic matching market by considering a simple model in which applicants who face an application cost strategically choose portfolios of applications. Universities then play a decentralized offer game in which unaccepted offers result in failure to trade on both sides of the market. We characterize a basic equilibrium to illustrate the sorting role that application costs play. In a numeric example, we illustrate how reduced application costs can result in increased matching frictions.