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Organizational form and output quality
Author(s) -
Dubrovinsky Mati,
Winter Ralph A.
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/caje.12129
Subject(s) - arrow , microeconomics , profit (economics) , economics , quality (philosophy) , information asymmetry , empirical research , altruism (biology) , variance (accounting) , industrial organization , computer science , mathematics , psychology , social psychology , statistics , philosophy , accounting , epistemology , programming language
This paper re‐examines the relationship between a firm's organizational form, not‐for‐profit versus for‐profit, and its output quality. The Arrow‐Hansmann theory of hidden action on the part of providers predicts higher quality for not‐for‐profit suppliers. This prediction has a puzzling lack of support in the empirical literature. We propose a theory that resolves the empirical puzzle and generates additional testable implications. The theory starts with the traditional assumptions of hidden action and supplier altruism. It then incorporates two additional features of real‐world markets: hidden information on supplier ability to provide high quality and a variation across buyers in the degree of informational asymmetry. The central prediction of the theory is that quality has a higher variance across for‐profits than across not‐for‐profits. Preliminary evidence from the US market for hospital care is consistent with this prediction.