Premium
Entry, reputation and intellectual property rights enforcement
Author(s) -
Che Jiahua,
Qiu Larry,
Zhou Wen
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/caje.12104
Subject(s) - multinational corporation , enforcement , intellectual property , incentive , reputation , welfare , business , social welfare , law and economics , economics , industrial organization , international trade , microeconomics , market economy , law , political science , finance
We examine how reputation concerns induce a multinational to partly withhold its entry into a developing country under weak intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement. Equilibrium IPR violations are shown to arise only in the presence of such concerns. Holding constant a multinational's incentive to innovate, better IPR enforcement encourages entry but reduces social welfare. The multinational's incentive to innovate may be inversely U‐shaped in the strength of IPR enforcement. If timed properly, however, stronger IPR enforcement can foster innovation without compromising social welfare. Testable implications concerning observable IPR violations are derived.