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Incentives for Journal Editors
Author(s) -
Kim Jinyoung,
Koh Kanghyock
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/caje.12077
Subject(s) - incentive , selection (genetic algorithm) , citation , computer science , test (biology) , positive economics , library science , data science , economics , artificial intelligence , biology , paleontology , microeconomics
Scholars may become journal editors because editors may generate more citations of their own works. This paper empirically establishes that a scholar's publications are more likely to be cited by papers in a journal that is edited by the scholar. We then test if editors exercise influence on authors to cite editors’ papers by either pressuring authors (“editor‐pressure” hypothesis) or accepting articles with references to the editors’ papers (“editor‐selection” hypothesis), by using the keyword analysis and the forward citation analysis, respectively. We find no evidence for the two hypotheses, which leaves self‐selection as a possible cause for the editor effect. JEL classification: J01