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SHIRKING, STANDARDS AND THE PROBABILITY OF DETECTION
Author(s) -
Sessions John G.,
Skåtun John D.
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/boer.12143
Subject(s) - economics , unemployment , profit maximization , wage , efficiency wage , profit (economics) , microeconomics , maximization , econometrics , labour economics , macroeconomics
By relaxing the common efficiency wage assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities, we demonstrate how standards and efficiency wages are related. In a more general setting where the probability of detection depends upon the equilibrium effort level of non‐shirkers, we show that the uniformly positive (negative) supply‐side relationship between wages (unemployment insurance) and effort is no longer guaranteed. Profit maximization on the part of the firm, however, ensures that effort will depend positively (negatively) on wages (unemployment insurance) in equilibrium.