Premium
WHOLESALE PRICES AND COURNOT‐BERTRAND COMPETITION
Author(s) -
Rozanova Olga
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/boer.12098
Subject(s) - cournot competition , bertrand competition , bertrand paradox (economics) , economics , marginal cost , competition (biology) , microeconomics , mathematical economics , oligopoly , ecology , biology
This note considers the competing vertical structures framework with Cournot‐Bertrand competition downstream. It shows that the equilibrium wholesale price paid by a Cournot (Bertrand)‐type retailer is above (below) marginal costs of a corresponding manufacturer. This result contrasts with the one under pure competition downstream (i.e., Cournot or Bertrand), where the wholesale price is set below (above) marginal costs in case of a Cournot (Bertrand) game at the retail level.