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ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION
Author(s) -
Lambertini Luca,
Tampieri Alessandro
Publication year - 2017
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/boer.12061
Subject(s) - duopoly , subgame perfect equilibrium , stackelberg competition , economics , quality (philosophy) , nash equilibrium , microeconomics , competition (biology) , subgame , mathematical economics , strategy , best response , cournot competition , game theory , epsilon equilibrium , ecology , philosophy , epistemology , biology
We modify the price‐setting version of the vertically differentiated duopoly model by Aoki (2003) by introducing an extended game in which firms noncooperatively choose the timing of moves at the quality stage. Our results show that there are multiple equilibria in pure strategies, whereby firms always select sequential play at the quality stage. We also investigate the mixed‐strategy equilibrium, revealing that the probability of generating outcomes out of equilibrium is higher than the probability of playing one Nash equilibria in pure strategies. In the alternative case with full market coverage, we show that the quality stage is solved in dominant strategies and therefore the choice of roles becomes irrelevant as the Nash and Stackelberg solutions coincide. With full market coverage and corner solution, the results show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, where the high‐quality firm takes the lead in the quality stage.