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Omission bias and perceived intention in children and adults
Author(s) -
Hayashi Hajimu
Publication year - 2015
Publication title -
british journal of developmental psychology
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.062
H-Index - 75
eISSN - 2044-835X
pISSN - 0261-510X
DOI - 10.1111/bjdp.12082
Subject(s) - psychology , judgement , commission , nothing , social psychology , developmental psychology , law , philosophy , epistemology , political science
Omission bias refers to the tendency to judge acts of commission as morally worse than equivalent acts of omission. Children aged 7–8 and 11–12 years, as well as adults, made moral judgements about acts of commission and omission in two conditions in which the protagonist obtained a self‐directed benefit. In the antisocial condition, the other person was harmed; in the selfish condition, the other person was not harmed. The results showed that adults and both age groups of children judged that the agent who did something (act of commission) was morally worse than the agent who did nothing (omission) for both antisocial and selfish conditions, although this judgement tendency was clearer in the selfish condition than in the antisocial condition. Agent intention was held constant across commission and omission, but most participants rated the intention of the agent who did something as stronger than that of the agent who did nothing. These results suggest that omission bias occurs regardless of differences in age and situation. In addition, perceived intention appears to change in conjunction with omission bias.