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The future‐like‐ours argument, animalism, and mereological universalism
Author(s) -
Sauchelli Andrea
Publication year - 2018
Publication title -
bioethics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.494
H-Index - 55
eISSN - 1467-8519
pISSN - 0269-9702
DOI - 10.1111/bioe.12417
Subject(s) - argument (complex analysis) , universalism , philosophy , epistemology , mereology , metaphysics , incompatibilism , dilemma , supporter , political science , free will , law , genealogy , history , medicine , politics , compatibilism
Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future‐like‐ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.