Avoiding the Personhood Issue: Abortion, Identity, and M arquis's ‘Future‐Like‐Ours’ Argument

One reason for the persistent appeal of D on M arquis' ‘future like ours’ argument ( FLO ) is that it seems to offer a way to approach the debate about the morality of abortion while sidestepping the difficult task of establishing whether the fetus is a person. This essay argues that in order to satisfactorily address both of the chief objections to FLO – the ‘identity objection’ and the ‘contraception objection’ – M arquis must take a controversial stand on what is most essential to being the kind of entity that an adult human being is. Such a stand amounts to a controversial account of personhood. To the extent that FLO 's success depends on accepting such a controversial metaphysical view, one apparent attraction of FLO proves illusory.