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Academic Freedom and the Professional Responsibilities of Applied Ethicists: A comment on Minerva
Author(s) -
Dawson Angus,
Herington Jonathan
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
bioethics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.494
H-Index - 55
eISSN - 1467-8519
pISSN - 0269-9702
DOI - 10.1111/bioe.12095
Subject(s) - harm , academic freedom , sociology , epistemology , moral responsibility , law , political science , philosophy , higher education
Academic freedom is an important good, but it comes with several responsibilities. In this commentary we seek to do two things. First, we argue against F rancesca M inerva's view of academic freedom as presented in her article ‘New threats to academic freedom’ on a number of grounds. We reject the nature of the absolutist moral claim to free speech for academics implicit in the article; we reject the elitist role for academics as truth‐seekers explicit in her view; and we reject a possible more moderate re‐construction of her view based on the harm/offence distinction. Second, we identify some of the responsibilities of applied ethicists, and illustrate how they recommend against allowing for anonymous publication of research. Such a proposal points to the wider perils of a public discourse which eschews the calm and careful discussion of ideas.