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Conscientious Refusals and Reason‐Giving
Author(s) -
Marsh Jason
Publication year - 2014
Publication title -
bioethics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.494
H-Index - 55
eISSN - 1467-8519
pISSN - 0269-9702
DOI - 10.1111/bioe.12012
Subject(s) - conscience , conscientious objector , character (mathematics) , object (grammar) , epistemology , health care , law , psychology , law and economics , philosophy , sociology , political science , linguistics , geometry , spanish civil war , mathematics
Some philosophers have argued for what I call the reason‐giving requirement for conscientious refusal in reproductive healthcare. According to this requirement, healthcare practitioners who conscientiously object to administering standard forms of treatment must have arguments to back up their conscience, arguments that are purely public in character. I argue that such a requirement, though attractive in some ways, faces an overlooked epistemic problem: it is either too easy or too difficult to satisfy in standard cases. I close by briefly considering whether a version of the reason‐giving requirement can be salvaged despite this important difficulty.