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Corporate Environmental Responsibilities and Executive Compensation: A Risk Management Perspective
Author(s) -
Hao Jongyu Paula,
Kang Fei
Publication year - 2019
Publication title -
business and society review
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.524
H-Index - 21
eISSN - 1467-8594
pISSN - 0045-3609
DOI - 10.1111/basr.12166
Subject(s) - executive compensation , incentive , perspective (graphical) , compensation (psychology) , business , enterprise value , risk management , accounting , financial risk management , actuarial science , economics , finance , microeconomics , psychology , social psychology , artificial intelligence , computer science
In this article, we examine how firms design executive compensation in light of their risk environment. Prior literature shows that corporate environmental responsibility (CER) of a firm inversely affects firm risk. We argue that firms with better CER performance benefit from the reduced firm risk, and therefore are more likely to provide greater managerial risk‐taking incentives to encourage the risk‐averse managers to undertake risk‐increasing but positive net present value (NPV) investments. Consistent with our hypotheses, we find that a firm’s CER rating is positively associated with its CEO risk‐taking incentives (vega) in the following year. We also document cross‐sectional variations in the CER‐vega relationship, that is, a weaker association in the controversial industries. This study contributes to the literature by investigating the role of CER on executive compensation design from the perspective of risk management.